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Executive Summary 115
Data center infrastructures are rapidly becoming virtualized due to increasing deployment of 116 virtualized hosts (also called hypervisor hosts). Virtual Machines (VMs) are the key resources to 117 be protected in this virtualized infrastructure since they are the compute engines hosting mission-118 critical applications of the enterprise. Since VMs are end-nodes of a virtual network, the 119 configuration of the virtual network forms an important element in the overall security strategy 120
for VMs. 121 122
The purpose of this NIST Special Publication is to provide an analysis of various virtual network 123 configuration options for protection of virtual machines (VMs) and provide security 124 recommendations based on the analysis. The configuration areas, which are relevant from a 125 security point of view, that are discussed in this publication are: Network Segmentation, 126
Network Path Redundancy, Firewall Deployment Architecture and VM Traffic 127
Monitoring. Different configuration options in each of these areas have different advantages and 128 disadvantages. These are identified in this publication to arrive at a set of one or more security 129 recommendations for each configuration area. 130 131
The motivation for this document is the trend in US Federal government agencies to deploy 132 server virtualization within their internal IT infrastructure as well as the use of VMs provided by 133 a cloud service provider for deploying agency applications. Hence the target audience is Chief 134
Information Security Officers (CISO) and other personnel/contractors involved in configuring 135 the system architecture for hosting multi-tier agency applications and for provisioning the 136 necessary security protections through appropriate virtual network configurations. The intended 137 goal is that the analysis of the various configuration options (in terms of advantages and 138 disadvantages) provided in this report, along with security recommendations, will facilitate 139 making informed decisions with respect to architecting the virtual network configuration. Such a 140 configuration is expected to ensure the appropriate level of protection for all VMs and the 141 application workloads running in them in the entire virtualized infrastructure of the enterprise .  142  143  144  145  146  147  148  149  150  151  152  153  154  155  156  157  158 207  208  209  210  211  212  213  214  215  216  217  218  219  220  221  222  223  224  225  226  227  228  229 
Organization of this Publication
277
The organization of the rest of this publication is as follows: 278 Section 2 -discusses five network segmentation approaches for virtualized infrastructures 279
Section 3 -discusses the technique for creating network path redundancy in virtual networks 280 Section 4 -discusses three types of firewall usage for control of virtual network traffic 281
Section 5 -discusses two configuration approaches for capturing traffic for VM monitoring. 282 283 2
Network Segmentation Configurations for VM Protection
284
There is a viewpoint among security practitioners that network segmentation is a purely network 285 management technique and not a security protection measure. However, many practitioners 286 consider network segmentation as an integral part or at least a preliminary step of a defense-in-287 depth network security strategy. There are some standards such as PCI DSS 3.0 that calls forth 288
for network segmentation as a security requirement for data protection. 289
The five network segmentation approaches discussed in this section are organized in their 290 increasing order of scalability. The main motivation for network segmentation is to achieve 291 logical separation for applications of different sensitivity levels in the enterprise. The initial 292 approach to achieve this is by hosting all applications of a given sensitivity level in one VM and 293 hosting all VMs of the same sensitivity level (based on hosted applications) in a given virtualized 294 host (Section 2.1). This is strictly not a network segmentation approach (since it does not involve 295 configuration of a network parameter) but is still included as one of the network segmentation 296 approach since the objective of providing VM protection is met. -pNIC2 that is connected to a physical switch in the data center's internal network. The firewall 360 appliances running in VM1 and VM4 respectively play the role of internet-facing firewall and 361 internal firewall respectively. This is due to the fact that VM1 acts as the traffic control bridge 362 between the virtual switches VS1 and VS2 while VM4 acts as the traffic control bridge between 363 the virtual switches VS2 and VS3. What this configuration has done is to create an isolated 364 virtual network segment based on the virtual switch VS2 (DMZ of the virtual network), since 365 VS2 can only communicate with the internet using firewall in VM1 and with the internal 366 network using the firewall in VM4. Hence all VMs connected to the virtual switch VS2 (in our 367 configuration the VMs -VM2 & VM3) run in this isolated virtual network segment as well, with 368 all traffic into and from them to/from external network controlled by firewall in VM1 and all 369 traffic into and from them to/from internal network controlled by firewall in VM4. 370
Looking at the above virtual network configuration from a VM point of view (irrespective of 371 whether they run a firewall or a business application), we find that VMs VM1 and VM4 are 372 multi-homed VMs with at least one of the vNICs connected to a virtual switch whose uplink port 373 is connected to a physical NIC. By contrast, the VMs VM2 & VM3 are connected only to a 374
Internal-only virtual switch (i.e., VS2 -that is not connected to any physical NIC. A virtual 375 switch that is not connected to any physical NIC is called an "Internal-only Switch") and hence 376
we can state that VMs connected only to Internal-only switches enjoy a degree of isolation as 377 they run in an isolated virtual network segment. 378
Advantages
379
• Virtual firewalls come packaged as Virtual Security Appliances on purpose-built VMs 380
and hence are easy to deploy. 381
• Since virtual firewalls run on VMs, they can be easily integrated with virtualization 382 management tools/servers and hence can be easily configured (especially their security 383 rules or ACLs) as well. 384
Disadvantages
385
• The VMs hosting the virtual firewall appliance compete for the same hypervisor 386 resources (i.e., CPU cores, memory etc) as VMs running business applications. 387
• The span of the protected network segment that is created is limited to a single virtualized 388 host. Migration of the VMs in the protected network segment (for load balancing or fault 389 tolerance reasons) to another virtualized host is possible only if the target host has 390 identical virtual network configuration. Creating virtualized hosts with identical virtual 391 network configuration may limit full utilization of the overall capacity of the hosts. On 392 the flip side, it may constrain VM migration flexibility. 393
Network Segmentation using VLANS in Virtual Network
394
VLANs were originally implemented in data centers where nodes were configured to operate in 395
Ethernet-switched modes for ease of control and network management (e.g., broadcast 396 containment). Being a network segmentation technique, it provided value as a security measure 397 because of the traffic isolation effect. In a data center with all physical (non-virtualized) hosts, a 398 VLAN is defined by assigning a unique ID called VLAN tag to one or more ports of a physical 399 switch. All hosts connected to those ports then become members of that VLAN ID. Thus a 400 logical grouping of servers (hosts) is created, irrespective of their physical locations, in the large 401 flat network of a data center (since the 6-byte MAC address of the host's NICs do not reflect its 402 topological location (the switch/router to which it is connected)). An example of a VLAN 403
Configuration is shown in Figure 2 . 404
The concept of VLAN can be extended and implemented in a data center with virtualized hosts 405 (in fact inside each virtualized host) using virtual switches with ports or port groups that support 406 
528
• The overlay-based network segmentation is infinitely scalable compared to the VLAN-529 based approach due to the following: 530 (a) A VXLAN network identifier (VNID) is a 24 bit field compared to the 12 bit VLAN 531 ID. Hence the namespace for VXLANs (and hence the number of network segments 532 that can be created) is about 16 million as opposed to 4096 for VLANs. 533 (b) Another factor contributing to scalability of the overlay scheme is that the 534 encapsulating packet is an IP/UDP packet. Hence the number of network segments 535 that can be defined is limited only by the number of IP subnets in the data center and 536 not by the number of ports of virtual switches as in the case of VLAN-based network 537 segmentation. 538
• In a data center that is offered for IaaS cloud service, isolation between the tenants (cloud 539 service subscribers) can be achieved by assigning each of them at least one VXLAN 540 segment (denoted by a unique VXLAN ID). Since VXLAN is a logical L2 layer network 541 (called overlay network) running on top of a physical L3 layer (IP) network inside the 542 data center, the latter is independent of the former. In other words, no device of the 543 physical network has its configuration dependent on the configuration in any part of 544 virtual network. The consequence of this feature is that it gives the freedom to locate the 545 computing and/or storage nodes belonging to a particular client in any physical segment 546 of the data center network. This freedom and flexibility in turn, helps to locate those 547 computing/storage resources based on performance (high performance VMs for 548 data/compute intensive workloads) and load balancing considerations. This results in 549 greater VM mobility and hence its availability. 550 551
Disadvantages of Overlay-based Network Segmentation
552
• A given network segment (a particular VXLAN ID) can exist in any virtualized host in 553 the data center. Hence routing packets between any two VMs requires large mapping 554 tables (in the overlay-network end points) in order to generate encapsulated packets -555 since the MAC address of the destination VM could be located in any IP subnet and in 556 any virtualized host in the data center. Building these mapping tables using just flooding 557 technique is inefficient. Hence a control plane needs to be deployed in the virtualized 558 infrastructure to populate the mapping tables for use by overlay packet generation module 559 in the hypervisor. This creates an additional layer of control and adds to the complexity 560 of network management. 561 562
Security Recommendations for Network Segmentation
563
VM-VN-R1: In all VLAN deployments, the switch ( physical switch connecting to 564
virtualized host) port configuration should be VLAN aware -i.e., its configuration should 565 reflect the VLAN profile of the connected virtualized host. 566
VM-VN-R2: Large data center networks with hundreds of virtualized hosts and thousands
567
of VMs and requiring many segments should deploy an overlay-based virtual networking 568 because of scalability (Large Namespace) and Virtual/Physical network independence. 569 
VM-VN-R3: Large overlay-based virtual networking deployments should always include
VM protection through Traffic Control using Firewalls 639
The primary use of a firewall is for traffic control. In a virtualized infrastructure, traffic control 640 for VM protection is to be exercised for the following two scenarios. 641
• Traffic flowing between any two virtual network segments (or subnets) 642
• All traffic flowing into and out of a VM 643 644
There are several use cases where traffic flowing between two VMs (or groups of VMs) need to 645 be controlled, regardless of whether the VMs are resident within the same virtualized host or in 646 different virtualized hosts. The following are some of them: 647
• The total set of applications in an enterprise may be of different sensitivity levels. It is 648 impractical to segregate them by running each category (applications of the same sensitivity 649 level) in different virtualized hosts. Hence a given virtualized host may contain VMs of 650 different sensitivity levels (assuming that all applications hosted in a VM are of the same 651 sensitivity level). Hence there is the need to control traffic between VMs within the same 652 virtualized host (inter-VM intra-host traffic). 653
• Most large scale enterprise applications are designed with three-tier architecture -Web 654 Server, Application Logic and Database tiers. There may be multiple VMs associated with 655 each tier and generally for reasons of load balancing and security, VMs hosting applications 656 belonging to a particular tier are generally assigned to the same network segment or subnet 657 though spanning across multiple virtualized hosts. This type of configuration gives rise to the 658 presence of Web Server subnet (segment), Database Server subnet etc. However, for any 659 enterprise application to function, the webserver tier of the application needs to talk to the 660 corresponding application logic tier which in turn may need to communicate with database 661 tier of that application. Hence it is obvious that a VM hosting a web server tier and housed in 662 the subnet-A needs controlled connectivity to a VM hosting an application logic tier and 663 housed in another subnet-B. Since a subnet itself can multiple virtualized hosts, it is needless 664 to say that VMs belonging to different application tiers (on a dedicated subnet) may be 665 located in different virtualized hosts and the traffic between them controlled as well (inter-666 VM inter-host traffic). 667
• In some enterprises, networks are segmented based on departments in an enterprise (this 668 applies even if the underlying infrastructure is virtualized), the need for exchanging data 669 selectively between applications belonging to two different departments (say marketing and 670 manufacturing), may require communication between a VM in the marketing segment and a 671 VM in the manufacturing segment. 672 673
The common requirement in all the use cases discussed above is that all inter-VM traffic must be 674 subjected to policy-based inspection and filtering. Inter-VM traffic is initiated when a VM 675 generates communication packets that are sent through a virtual NIC of that VM to the port of a 676 virtual switch defined inside the hypervisor kernel. If the target VM resides inside the same 677 virtualized host, these packets are forwarded to another port in the same virtual switch. The 678 target VM (dedicated to it) may either be connected to the same virtual switch or the connection 679 to the target VM may go through another VM that acts as a bridge between virtual switches of 680 the two communicating VMs. If the target VM resides in another virtualized host, these packets 681 are sent to the uplink ports of that virtual switch to be forwarded to any of the physical NIC of 682 that virtualized host. From there these packets travel through the physical network of the data 683 center and on to the virtualized host where the target VM resides. The packets again travel 684 through the virtual network in that virtualized host to reach the target VM. Hence it is clear that 685
since VMs are end-nodes of a virtual network, the originating and ending network in any inter-686 VM communication are virtual networks. Hence a software-based virtual firewall either 687 functioning in a VM or in the hypervisor kernel would be a natural mechanism to control inter-688 VM traffic. However, since connection between any two virtual segments (in different 689 virtualized hosts at least) goes through a physical network, a physical firewall can also be 690 deployed to control inter-VM traffic between VMs in different virtualized hosts. Hence this was 691 one of the earliest approaches adopted for controlling inter-VM traffic. A physical firewall 692 configuration to control inter-VM traffic is analyzed for its pros and cons in section 4. 
788
• Much higher performance compared to a Subnet-level virtual firewall because of the fact 789 that packet processing is done not using the VM-assigned resources (virtual CPUs & virtual 790 memory) but using the hardware resources available to the hypervisor kernel. 791
• Since it is running as a hypervisor kernel module, its functionality cannot be monitored or 792 altered by a rogue VM with access to virtual network inside the hypervisor host. 793
• It has the greatest visibility into the state of the VM including virtual hardware, memory, 794 storage and applications besides the incoming and outgoing network traffic in each VM. 795
• It has direct access to all virtual switches and all the network interfaces of those switches. 796
Hence the scope of its packet monitoring and filtering functionality not only includes inter-797 VM traffic but also traffic from VM to the physical network (through the physical NICs of 798 the hypervisor host). 799
• To analyze communication packets going into or coming out of a VM, a functionality to copy 833 those packets (incoming or outgoing) and send them to a network monitor application (also 834 called analyzer application) is needed. This functionality is called port mirroring. The purpose of 835 a network monitoring application is to perform security analysis, network diagnostics and 836 generation of network performance metrics. In tune with the theme of this document, we only 837 focus on the configuration options available in hypervisor to turn on the port mirroring 838 functionality. Depending upon the hypervisor offering, this configuration option may exist as 839 either a VM-configuration feature or virtual switch port configuration feature with the common 840 goal being to set up a VM traffic monitoring capability. 841
Enabling VM Traffic Monitoring using VM Network Adapter Configuration
842
In some hypervisor offerings, the network monitoring application runs as a VM-based 843 application. Hence this VM and its virtual NIC becomes the destination VM/vNIC (analyzer 844 VM) to which traffic must be sent for analysis. The VM whose incoming/outgoing traffic is to be 845 monitored (monitored VM) becomes then the source VM/vNIC. Thus the values "Source" and 846 "Destination" are assigned to the "mirroring mode" configuration parameter of the network 847 adapters (vNICs) respectively of the monitored VM and analyzer VM. 848
Enabling VM Traffic Monitoring using Virtual Switch Port Configuration
849
There are two ways that a virtual switch can be configured to enable visibility into traffic flowing 850 into and out of a particular VM for use by a networking monitoring tool such as IDS or Sniffers. 851
They are: 852
• In the earlier versions of a virtual switch, the only configuration option available was to set a 853 particular VM port group into promiscuous mode. This will allow any VM connected to that 854 port group to have visibility into the traffic going into or coming out of all VMs connected to 855 that port group. 856
• In the latter versions of a virtual switch, the traffic flowing into and out of the port of a 857 virtual switch (to which the monitored VM is connected) can be forward to another specific 858 port. The target or destination port can be another virtual port or an uplink port. The 859 flexibility this provides is that the network monitoring application can be located either in a 860 VM or in the physical network outside the virtualized host. 
